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THE CONTRASTING EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL IN 
UK EXTRADITION LAW 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Extradition is a process whereby accused and convicted persons are 
lawfully transferred across borders from one territory to another.1 It 
is unquestionably important. It serves material public purposes. Lord 
Thomas in Polish Judicial Authorities v Celinski stated that there is: 
… a constant and weighty public interest in extradition that 
those accused of crimes should be brought to trial; that those 
convicted of crimes should serve their sentences; that the UK 
should honour its international obligations and the UK should 
not become a safe haven.2 
Balanced against these interests are factors including the human 
rights of requested persons. The challenge facing extradition law is 
to reasonably accommodate the conflicting interests at play. That 
process takes place in the context of UK law and public international 
law and is conditioned by public policy concerns. The accommodation 
has worked reasonably well. Cases that have engendered notable 
criticisms have been relatively rare.3 A particular challenge for the 
law, though, has been posed by article 6 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights 1950 (ECHR), protecting the right to a fair trial. 
Article 6 stands apart from those ECHR rights that play a meaningful 
role in UK extradition law and practice. Its role is partial and limited 
in law and fact. It is also one that has experienced contrasting 
fortunes. Whilst the right has come to have a degree of applicability 
within the UK in extradition hearings its extraterritorial operation has 
been restricted. This article analyses the limited role of the right to a 
fair trial in extradition and highlights the contrasting evolution 
between UK extradition hearings and trials abroad.4 
 
LAW AND CONTEXT 
                                                 
1 There is a large body of writing in the area. Of particular note are the House of 
Lords Select Committee on Extradition Law, Extradition: UK Law and Practice,  10 
March 2015, cited at 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201415/ldselect/ldextradition/126/126.pd
f and A Review of Extradition, published in September 2011 (the Baker Review), 
cited at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/.../extradition-review.pdf.  
2 [2015] EWHC 1274 (Admin) at para 6, referring to the judgement of Lady Hale 
in Norris v Government of the United States (No. 2) [2010] UKSC 9 at para 8.  
3 Addressing certain of those criticisms is P Arnell, The European Human Rights 
Influence upon United Kingdom Extradition – Myth Debunked, (2013) 21 European 
Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 317. 
4 It builds upon P Arnell, Extradition and the Right to a Fair Trial, (2013) 36 Scots 
Law Times 247. 
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Extradition necessarily involves two States or territories. 5  It is 
generally governed internationally by bilateral treaties6 and within 
the UK by the Extradition Act 2003 (2003 Act). International 
agreements regulating the transfer of accused and convicted persons 
are of considerable pedigree. The Treaty of Amity, Commerce and 
Navigation (Jay’s Treaty) 1794-17957 between Great Britain and the 
United States is a notable early example. The most contentious treaty 
in recent times, from a UK perspective, is the UK-US Extradition 
Treaty 2003. In UK law the development of extradition law and 
procedure is reflected in 6 & 7 Vict. C. 75 and 6 & 7 Vict. C.76 enacted 
in 1843, the Extradition Act 1870, and the Extradition Act 1989. 
These statutes governed extradition to territories apart from those 
comprising Her Majesty’s Dominions.8 Pursuant to an international 
extradition agreement one territory may request another to deliver 
an accused or convicted person present within it. That request can, 
and often does, give rise to judicial proceedings in both the requested 
and requesting territories. Where the UK is the requested territory an 
extradition hearing can take place where, inter alia, a court considers 
whether the formalities of the process are being adhered to – long 
standing examples here include the requirement of a prima facie case 
being made out, and those arising from the principles of double 
criminality and speciality. Within the requesting territory there may 
be a criminal trial, where the requested person is tried for the offence 
underpinning the request. These basic facts are relevant because 
they highlight that there appears to be, in some cases at least, two 
occasions where the right to a fair trial could apply to offer some 
protection to the individual subject to the request.  
 
The 2003 Act contains three distinct sets of rules governing 
export extradition - where the UK has received a request from a third 
territory. Each set pertains to specific type of extradition relationship 
between the UK and third territories. They are those governed by the 
European Arrest Warrant (known as Category 1 extraditions under 
the 2003 Act), those governed by a bilateral extradition treaty 
(Category 2) and all others. Category 1 extraditions take place under 
the EAW scheme of surrender of accused and convicted persons 
                                                 
5 ‘Territory’ is often preferred to ‘State’ because non-State actors may exceptionally 
be party to an extradition agreement, for example Gibraltar.   
6 Of course the pre-eminent exception is the European Arrest Warrant. The Council 
Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures 
between Member States 2002/584, as amended, governs surrender as between EU 
Member States. 
7  https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/ampage?collId=llsl&fileName=008/llsl008.db&recNum=129.  
8 For a general history of UK extradition law see A Review of Extradition, supra note 
1 at pp 26-72.   
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between the 28 EU Member States and Gibraltar. It is a streamlined 
system that differs from historical and orthodox UK extradition 
practice. Extradition to Category 2 territories, and all other territories, 
reflects the traditional form of UK extradition. The main differences 
between the two are that a requesting EU territory need not establish 
a prima facie against the requested person, that surrenders within 
the EU are wholly judicial, and that the traditional double criminality 
requirement is substituted with a Framework List of offences under 
the EAW.9 Territories not a party to a bilateral extradition treaty with 
the UK nor a EU Member State must rely on ad hoc arrangements or 
existing international criminal conventions making provision for 
extradition.  
 
Where an extradition request is made to the UK the law 
provides that a hearing must take place where the requested person 
may consent to being extradited or not, regardless of the particular 
arrangements governing that case. Where the individual does not 
consent a court will consider the request and any arguments put 
forward in opposition to extradition. The 2003 Act provides that a 
number of arguments, or bars, can be put forward. If successful the 
extradition does not proceed. Bars include human rights, double 
jeopardy, the absence of a prosecution decision in the requesting 
territory, the passage of time, age, speciality and forum.10 Further 
discussion of UK extradition hearings will take place below, presently, 
though, it should be noted that extradition from the UK entails a 
hearing that may consider evidence against a requested person, 
possible human rights violations, the proper forum for the trial and 
the proportionality of the extradition. All of these decisions are taken 
with a view to whether the individual should be forcibly transferred 
from the UK to a third territory.  
 
Extradition requests can be made for both accused and 
convicted persons. Accused persons are sought to stand trial in the 
requesting State, and convicted persons in order to serve a sentence 
subsequent to conviction. This point is relevant in that it may affect 
the fact that there are two instances where the right to a fair trial 
may be considered in an extradition – within the UK at the extradition 
hearing and outside the UK at the trial following the individual’s 
transfer. In a conviction case it prima facie appears that the right to 
                                                 
9 Notably, the Framework Decision itself does not refer to human rights as a 
possible bar to extradition. In Criminal Proceedings Against Aranyosi (C-404/15) 
EU:C2016:198, however, the CJEU Grand Chamber held that the EAW scheme does 
not have the effect of modifying the obligation to respect fundamental rights as 
enshrined in, inter alia, the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights. EU law will be 
mentioned further below. 
10 A number of the bars are found in ss 11 and 79 of the 2003 Act for Category 1 
and Category 2 territories respectively. The human rights bar is found in ss 21A 
and 87. 
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a fair trial has no possible extraterritorial application – the individual 
has already been tried, convicted and sentenced. Whilst this may 
indeed be the case there are circumstances where it does apply in 
this way. This arises through the rules governing trials in absentia in 
the 2003 Act. They provide that where an individual was convicted in 
absentia the judge at the hearing must consider whether the 
requested person deliberately absented himself from the trial, and if 
not, whether he would be entitled to a retrial or a review amounting 
to a retrial.11 If the requested person is not entitled to a retrial or 
review in the circumstances he is to be discharged. Generally, then, 
the point that needs to be made is that there are in many cases two 
separate hearings which might be conditioned with fair trial 
protection, one within the UK and one abroad. The question being 
addressed presently is whether, and if so how, UK law acts in that 
manner. Firstly, though, it is useful to trace the origins and basis of 
the application of human rights to extradition and to iterate the 
reasons why that application is generally desirable.  
 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND EXTRADITION 
 
The subjection of extradition to human rights protection within the 
Council of Europe dates from 1989.12 Its origins are found in the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and in 
particular the seminal case of Soering v UK.13 Here, in a well-known 
passage, the ECtHR stated that it:  
… would hardly be compatible with the underlying values of the 
Convention… were a Contracting State knowingly to surrender 
a fugitive to another State where there were substantial 
grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture… Extradition in such circumstances… would 
plainly be contrary to the spirit and intendment of the Article 
(art 3)….14 
In Soering the death row phenomenon was measured against the 
protection provided by article 3, guaranteeing freedom from torture 
                                                 
11 By section 20 for Category 1 extraditions and section 85 for Category 2. Cases 
arising here include Lord Advocate v Harrison [2015] EDIN 55; 2015 WL 4635391, 
and Balaeiharis v Greece [2015] EWHC 3702 (Admin). 
12 Academic authorities include J Dugard and C Van den Wyngaert, Reconciling 
Extradition with Human Rights, (1998) 92(2) AJIL 187 and C Van den Wyngaert, 
Applying the European Convention on Human Rights to Extradition: Opening 
Pandora's Box?, (1990) 39(4) ICLQ 797. 
13 (1989) 11 EHRR 439. There are several authorities relating to extradition and 
human rights pre-dating Soering, including Agee v UK, 17 Dec. 1976, Application 
No. 7729/76, cited at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-74884. As noted 
above, various protections were afforded requested persons prior to the 
introduction of human rights to the process including those found in European 
Convention on Extradition 1957. 
14 Ibid at para 88.  
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and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment.15 The US 
had sought Soering from the UK for a murder in West Virginia. His 
case was ‘foreign’ in that the putative human rights violation would 
take place outside the UK. Such cases are distinguished from 
‘domestic’ cases, where the circumstances giving rise to the human 
rights violation take place within the country.16 The acceptance that 
in an extradition human rights violations can be both ‘domestic’ and 
‘foreign’ underlines the point that there may be two opportunities for 
the right to a fair trial to apply within an extradition - the judicial 
proceedings before and after the rendition. This position follows the 
enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the incorporation of 
the ECHR into UK law, as well as the germane provision within the 
2003 Act. Also of relevance is section 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998 
which obliges UK court to take into account decisions of the ECtHR in 
so far as they are relevant to the case in question.17 
 
The reasons why it is considered appropriate to condition 
extradition with human rights protection are not difficult to find. The 
rationale is centred upon the importance of extradition to the 
individuals subjected to it, entailing, as it does, their forcible removal 
from a country. For UK nationals it is the only process under which 
they can be removed from their country.18 Extradition necessarily 
deprives persons of the prerequisite for the full enjoyment of human 
rights under UK law – their physical presence within the country. The 
rights to be free from torture and to private and family life, for 
example, are deprived of full and immediate effect upon one’s 
transfer from the UK.19 A person who has been extradited cannot 
                                                 
15 Soering also argued, unsuccessfully, on the basis of article 6. See further below. 
A deportation case shedding light on the test to be applied where the putative 
human rights violation occurs outside the UK is EM (Lebanon) v Secretary of State 
[2008] UKHL 64. 
16 This designation was coined by Lord Bingham in Regina Ex Parte Ullah (FC) v 
Special Adjudicator [2004] UKHL 26 at para 9. 
17 The precise nature of the obligation upon UK courts under section 2 of the Human 
Rights Act 1998 is the subject of debate, centring upon whether courts must mirror 
ECtHR jurisprudence, can offer greater human rights protection or indeed may 
interpret Convention rights more restrictively. See Klug, F., and Wildbore, H., 
Follow or Lead? The Human Rights Act and the European Court of Human Rights, 
(2010) 6 European Human Rights Law Review 621, and Malkani, B., A Rights-
specific Approach to Section 2 of the Human Rights Act, (2012) 5 European Human 
Rights Law Review 516. As will be seen below, in ‘domestic’ cases in the context of 
extradition and article 6 the Supreme Court has gone beyond the position of the 
ECtHR and in ‘foreign’ cases UK courts have arguably taken a more restrictive 
approach. 
18 UK nationals cannot be deported.  
19 Diplomatic assurances putatively act to prevent human rights violations upon 
extradition and deportation. They do not, however, negate the fact that protection 
under UK law is lost upon rendition. See R Grozdanova, The United Kingdom and 
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directly and immediately engage the UK legal system’s institutions in 
an attempt to defend and vindicate her rights. Relatedly, the Human 
Rights Act 1998 generally applies on a territorial basis. Whilst article 
1 of the ECHR refers to ‘jurisdiction’, not ‘territory’, the extraterritorial 
application of human rights under the ECHR and the Human Rights 
Act 1998 is rare.20 Indeed Soering is authority for the fact that human 
rights will apply abroad only in especial circumstances. In that case 
the UK could have been indirectly responsible for a violation of article 
3 were Soering extradited.21 This brings to the fore a significant 
factor in favour of the application of human rights to extradition – 
that the process can indirectly lead to an infringement abroad. 
Further, as noted, an extradition may give rise to a human rights 
violation within the UK. ‘Domestic’ cases, for example, commonly 
argue that an extradition would violate one’s right to private and 
family life under article 8. A leading case here is Norris v Government 
of the US (No 2), where the Supreme Court rejected an argument 
that the extradition of Norris would disproportionately interfere with 
his family life in light of his age, ill health and the circumstances of 
his wife. An extradition, therefore, affects the degree of UK human 
rights protection available to a requested person and may in itself 
cause or lead to an immediate or future human rights violation. 
 
The rationale in favour of subjecting extradition to human 
rights protection generally is relatively straightforward. So too is the 
argument that the right to a fair trial be included as one of those 
entitlements, prima facie at least. Article 6 inter alia provides ‘In the 
determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal 
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing 
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law’. The protection offered under article 6 is of 
indubitable importance. The ECtHR has noted the ‘… prominent place 
which the right to a fair trial holds in a democratic society within the 
meaning of the Convention’.22  The right centres upon procedural 
propriety which ‘… lie[s] at the heart of any legal system grounded in 
                                                 
Diplomatic Assurances: A Minimalist Approach towards the Anti-Torture Norm, 
(2015) 15 International Criminal Law Review 369. 
20 Article 1 provides ‘The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within 
their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention’. 
There is a considerable body of case law and accompanying academic literature on 
the subject. This includes Al-Skeini and others v UK,(2011) 53 EHRR 18 and P 
Arnell, Law Across Borders – The Extraterritorial Application of United Kingdom 
Law, Routledge, London 2012.  
21 In other circumstances the UK, and other ECHR state parties, can be directly 
responsible for extraterritorial human rights violations, for example through the 
actions of their diplomatic and consular agents. See Ocalan v Turkey (2005) 41 
EHRR 45. The exceptional nature of the extraterritorial application of human rights 
underpins the discussion below of the applicability of article 6 to trials abroad. 
22 De Cubber v Belgium, Application 9186/80, at para 30. 
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the rule of law’.23 Relatedly, the ECtHR in Salabiaku v France stated 
‘… the object and purpose of Article 6… by protecting the right to a 
fair trial and in particular the right to be presumed innocent, is 
intended to enshrine the fundamental principle of the rule of law’.24 
In light of the importance of the right to a fair trial, and the 
applicability of human rights protection to extradition generally, it is 
not unreasonable to assume that article 6 plays a prominent and 
material role in extradition. This is not the case. Indeed, the effect of 
the right to a fair trial in extradition has been almost negligible. Article 
6 has historically not applied to UK extradition hearings at all.25 
Whilst it has had limited applicability to trials abroad for some time, 
successful cases have been very rare indeed. From this partial and 
restrictive position the law has evolved in contrasting ways. On the 
one hand there has been judicial acceptance that the right to a fair 
trial applies to UK hearings to a certain extent whilst on the other the 
right’s extraterritorial applicability has been increasingly narrowed. 
This position is based in a body of jurisprudence reflecting varied 
considerations including the wording of article 6, international law 
and comity and the purposes of extradition.  
 
ARTICLE 6 AND UK EXTRADITION HEARINGS 
 
The first opportunity for article 6 to apply to an extradition is the 
hearing within the UK following a request. As noted, the 2003 Act 
provides that a requested person must be brought before a judge 
and, if he does not consent to being extradited or transferred, a 
hearing is to take place. The application of article 6 to such a hearing 
turns on the terms of the article itself, as interpreted by the ECtHR 
and UK courts. Article 6(1) begins ‘In the determination of his civil 
rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him…’. The 
core question, therefore, is whether an extradition hearing 
determines one’s civil rights or a criminal charge. The ECtHR has held 
that extradition hearings do neither, with the meaning of ‘criminal 
charge’ and ‘civil rights and obligations’ under the ECHR being 
autonomous from the law of State parties.26 Authority for the ECtHR’s 
                                                 
23 R Reed and J Murdoch, Human Rights Law in Scotland, Third Edition, Bloomsbury 
Professional, 2011, at p 517. 
24 (1989) 13 EHRR 379 at para 28.  
25  See in the context of the ECtHR and the UN Human Rights Committee G 
Mathisen, On the Fairness of Proceedings for Extradition and Surrender, [2010] 
European Human Rights Law Review 486 and in relation to a leading ECtHR case 
on the issue, mentioned below, B Poynor, Mamatkulov and Askurov v Turkey: the 
Relevance of Article 6 to Extradition Proceedings, [2005] European Human Rights 
Law Review 409. 
26 Maaouia v France (2001) 33 EHRR 42 at para 34. See also Parlanti v Germany 
(App. No. 45097/04), unreported, 26 May 2005 at para 5. 
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position is found in Raf v Spain. 27 Here an applicant inter alia argued 
that article 6(1) had been infringed on account of the length of time 
the extradition proceedings had taken. The ECtHR held on the point 
that ‘… extradition proceedings do not concern a dispute 
(contestation) over an applicant’s civil rights and obligations or the 
determination of a criminal charge against him or her within the 
meaning of Article 6 of the Convention’.  
 
A case that addressed the point that extradition hearings can be akin 
to a criminal trial in that they may entail an examination of evidence 
against a requested person, is Kirkwood v UK. 28  Here Kirkwood 
challenged his extradition on the basis of article 6(3)(d) because he 
was not able to cross examine witnesses against him at the committal 
hearing. That provision inter alia provides that everyone charged with 
a criminal offence has the right to examine or have examined 
witnesses against him. Kirkwood argued in particular that the hearing 
entailed an assessment of evidence to determine whether there was 
a prima facie case against him, and that unlike in 'normal trial 
proceedings' where any mistakes at the committal stage could be 
rectified during the trial itself this was not possible in extradition 
hearings. The European Commission of Human Rights (the 
Commission) accepted that extradition hearings involve a ‘certain, 
limited, examination of the issues which would be decisive in the 
applicant’s ultimate trial’, however it held that the committal 
proceedings did not form part of, or constitute, the determination of 
a criminal charge within the meaning of article 6.29  
 
Whilst extradition hearings do not determine a criminal charge, 
a requested person has been held to be charged with a criminal 
offence for the purposes of article 6(2) – unlike article 6(3). That 
provides that everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be 
presumed innocent. In P., R.H. and L.L. v Austria30, the applicants 
had allegedly committed drug offences under both US and Austrian 
law. They argued that the Austrian court had assumed a conviction 
in the US would follow the rendition with the result that the Austrian 
charges assumed lesser importance. The Commission held that while 
extradition proceedings do not come within the scope of articles 6(1) 
and 6(3), requested persons are to be considered as charged with a 
                                                 
27  21 Dec. 2000, Application no. 53652/00, at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-22200. The Court also noted that the 
applicant did not have a right not to be extradited. An American authority in a 
similar vein is US ex rel. Oppenheim v Hecht (1927) 16 F. 2d 955 where it is stated 
‘Extradition proceedings are not in their nature criminal, extradition is not 
punishment for crime, though such punishment may follow extradition…’, at p 956. 
28 (1984) 6 EHRR 373. 
29 Ibid at p 386.  
30 (5 Dec. 1989) App No. 15776/89. See also Ismoilov v Russia (2009) 49 EHRR 
42.  
9 
criminal offence within the meaning of art 6(2). On the facts the 
Commission held that the Austrian court did not judge the prospects 
of the criminal proceedings in the US and so there was no appearance 
of a violation of article 6(2). Overall, then, Convention jurisprudence 
is clear that an extradition hearing does not determine a criminal 
charge for the purposes of article 6(1) or 6(3) and so the fair trial 
protection afforded by those provisions are not applicable on that 
basis. This is in spite of articles 6(1) and 6(3) being conditioned 
differently, namely to circumstances where there is a determination 
of a civil right or criminal charge and where one is charged with a 
criminal offence respectively. 
 
With an extradition hearing not determining a criminal charge 
the only way that article 6 could apply is through it determining an 
individual’s civil rights and obligations. As with a criminal charge, 
though, both the Commission and the ECtHR have decided that they 
do no such thing.31 This position turns on a traditional interpretation 
that equates ‘civil’ with private law rights.32 As extradition law falls 
into the public sphere, this view holds, extradition hearings do not 
entail the determination of one’s civil rights and obligations. As Lester 
et al note the ‘… early jurisprudence of the ECtHR established that 
the use of the word “civil” in art 6(1) incorporated the distinction 
between private and public law, with civil rights and obligations being 
rights and obligations in private law’.33 Such a case is Agee v UK.34 
The Commission stated therein that: 
 … the right of an alien to reside in a particular country is a 
matter governed by public law. It considers that where the 
public authorities of a State decide to deport an alien on grounds 
of security, this constitutes an act of state falling within the 
public sphere and that it does not constitute a determination of 
his civil rights or obligations within the meaning of Art. 6. 
Accordingly, even though the decision to deport the applicant 
may have consequences in relation to his civil rights, in 
                                                 
31 In Mamatkulov and Askarov v Turkey (2005) 41 EHRR 494 the ECtHR stated, in 
a case about the fairness of Turkish extradition proceedings (as well as a future 
trial abroad), “… decisions regarding the entry, stay and deportation of aliens do 
not concern the determination of an Applicant’s civil rights or obligations or of a 
criminal charge against him, within the meaning of art 6(1) of the Convention’, at 
para 82. This case will be mentioned further below. 
32  A broadening of the scope of ‘civil rights and obligations’ is apparent in 
Commission and ECtHR jurisprudence. The inclusion within the meaning of certain 
administrative proceedings and public law questions has taken place. See further 
R Reed and J Murdoch, supra note 23 at p 511. 
33 A Lester, D Pannick and J Herberg (eds.), Human Rights Law and Practice, (Third 
Edition), LexisNexis 2009 at p 283. 
34  17 Dec. 1976, application 7729/76, cited at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-74884. 
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particular his reputation, the State is not required in such cases 
to grant a hearing conforming to the requirements of Art. 6(1).35 
Whilst Agee v UK was concerned with deportation, a similar view 
pertains to extradition. The rigidity of the equipartition of ‘civil rights’ 
with ‘private law’ rights has been weakened, as is evidenced in a 
dissenting opinion in Maaouia v France. 
 
Commission and ECtHR jurisprudence are both clear that article 
6 does not apply to extradition hearings. However, in the first ECtHR 
case to consider the question, Maaouia v France (the Commission had 
done so previously), is found an opinion that in effect presages an 
important Supreme Court decision, discussed below. Whilst the 
majority of the ECtHR followed the Commission’s position, the 
dissenting opinion of Judge Loucaides – joined by Judge Traja – held 
that article 6(1) did apply to expulsion hearings. They did so on 
account of their particular interpretation of ‘civil’. Judge Loucaides 
stated: 
What gives rise to a problem of interpretation in this case is the 
use of the word ‘civil’ in describing the ‘rights and obligations’ 
covered by the guarantees of Article 6(1). It was assumed that 
by the use of that word the drafters of the Article intended to 
confine the rights and obligations in question only to those 
falling within the domain of private law. I do not agree with this 
approach….36  
He continued: 
I believe that the word ‘civil’ when examined in the context in 
which it appears, has the meaning of ‘non-criminal’… It would 
be absurd to accept that the judicial safeguards were intended 
only for certain rights, particularly those between individuals, 
and not to any legal rights and obligations including those vis-
à-vis the administration where an independent judicial control 
is especially required for the protection of the individuals against 
the powerful authorities of the State. In other words, it is 
inconceivable… to provide for a fair administration of justice 
only in respect of certain legal rights and obligations, but not in 
respect of rights concerning relations between the individual 
and Government.37 
This reasoning has considerable merit. It accords – to an extent – 
with that in Pomiechowski v Poland.38  
                                                 
35 Ibid at para 28. 
36 Supra note 26 at para O-IV4. 
37 Ibid at para O-IV5 -para O-IV7 – footnotes omitted. An important factor in the 
decision of the majority was that article 1 of Protocol 7 to the Convention provided 
aliens with certain rights upon their expulsion. 
38 [2012] UKSC 20. Whilst the focus of this article is upon extradition hearings, it 
should be noted that within the UK the non-application of article 6 extends to a 
variety of hearings. Also excluded are challenges to asset freezing directions, R (on 
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Pomiechowski v Poland arose out of the short and inflexible 
time limits then applying under the 2003 Act to the rights of appeal 
of requested persons and requesting authorities. The relevant aspect 
of the case for our purposes was the appeal by a British citizen, 
Halligen. The Secretary of State had ordered his extradition and he 
had failed to comply with the 14 day time limit for the filing and 
service of notice of appeal to the Crown Prosecution Service. The High 
Court held it had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal in that it was time-
barred. Before the Supreme Court Halligen inter alia invoked article 
6(1).39 The Secretary of State contested its relevance to decisions to 
extradite. In coming to its decision the Supreme Court focused upon 
the distinction between aliens and citizens. Lord Mance, giving the 
leading opinion, noted that all the authorities cited to the court 
concerned the extradition or expulsion of non-nationals.40 He also 
referred the rights given to aliens subject to expulsion under article 
1 of Protocol 7 to the Convention.41 What this indicated, he held, was 
that State parties understood that expulsion proceedings of aliens 
were excluded from the scope of article 6(1). The exclusion of 
nationals did not necessarily follow. Here, British nationals possess 
an entitlement to remain within the UK under both international law 
and at common law.42 The presence of that entitlement or ‘civil right’ 
paved the way for the application of article 6(1) in the case.43 The 
Supreme Court held that extradition proceedings of a British citizen 
involved ‘the determination’ of that civil right. Since the enjoyment 
                                                 
the application of Bhutta) v HM Treasury [2011] EWHC 1789 (Admin) and 
deportation decisions by a Special Immigration Appeals Commission, W (Algeria) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2010] EWCA Civ 898. In regard to 
the latter Hoffman and Rowe state that “Some decisions may fall outside Article 6… 
not because they are in some sense internal and not general, but because they are 
not in any real sense judicial, which is to say made by an independent tribunal 
which is constituted to find facts and apply the law”, D Hoffman and J Rowe, Human 
Rights in the UK, Fourth Edition, Pearson, London, 2013, at p 235. Discussion of 
tribunals and hearings apart from extradition is beyond the scope of this article. 
39 He had also based his arguments upon the right to liberty, in particular article 
5(4) allowing persons deprived of their liberty to challenge the lawfulness of their 
detention. This argument was rejected by the Supreme Court.  
40 Supra note 38 at para 31. 
41 The UK has not signed nor ratified Protocol 7.  
42 Amongst the authorities cited was Van Duyn v Home Office, [1975] Ch 358 where 
the European Court of Justice stated that international law provides that a state is 
precluded from refusing to let its nationals enter or reside within it, at para 22.  
43  Lord Mance equates the common law right with a civil law right without 
explanation. Whilst concurring, reluctantly, with the majority Lady Hale noted that 
it is perhaps questionable whether the right of citizens to enter and remain the 
countries of which they are nationals counts as a ‘civil right’ for the purpose of the 
right to a fair hearing in article 6(1), at para 49, highlighting the view that as 
originally conceived article 6(1) did not apply to the rights enforceable only in public 
law. 
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of one’s common law right to remain within the UK was suspended, 
a requested national was entitled to a fair hearing. 
 
Applying article 6 to the facts of Halligen’s case the Supreme 
Court held that the statutory right of appeal must be free of any 
limitations that impair the very essence of the right and pursue a 
legitimate aim. There also must be a reasonable relationship of 
proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to 
be achieved.44 The particular provisions governing appeals, the Court 
held, did not meet this standard because the essence of the right of 
appeal may be impaired in individual cases due to the short and rigid 
time limits for appeals. Having made that decision, the Supreme 
Court chose to interpret the relevant provisions compatibly with 
article 6. This meant giving the High Court a discretion in exceptional 
circumstances to extend time for filing and service of notice of 
appeal. 45  Notably, Lord Mance commented upon the anomalous 
position of non-nationals resulting from the decision, saying that their 
cases ‘… appear to deserve attention’.46 Confirmation of this view was 
not long in coming. It is found in Agardi v Budapest, a decision which 
styled itself as a test case.47   
 
Agardi v Budapest confirms the limits of the law set out in 
Pomiechowski. Here, Hungary sought one of its own nationals under 
a conviction EAW. The question arose whether or not the High Court 
could extend the time limit for a non-British citizen to make an 
appeal. The answer was no. Agardi put forward arguments based on 
non-discrimination under article 14 of the ECHR in conjunction with 
articles 6 and 3 and under EU law. In regard to the article 14 
arguments the High Court held extradition proceedings against 
British citizens fell within the scope of article 6 is because they entail 
the determination of an extant civil right – non-nationals do not have 
such a civil right. Therefore there was nothing to which article 6(1) 
                                                 
44 The Court here referred to Tolstoy Miloslavsky v UK (1995) 20 EHRR 442. 
45 Supra note 38 at para 39. The 2003 Act has since been amended by the Anti-
Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 s 160 to permit appeals after the 
time period has ended where the person did everything reasonably possible to 
ensure notice of appeal was given as soon as it could be, by sections 26(5), 103(10) 
and 108(7A) (not extending to Scotland), in force 15 April 2015. The Criminal 
Procedure Rules now reflect the decision in Pomiechowski:  ‘17B.8 Where it is not 
possible for the High Court to begin to hear the appeal in accordance with time 
limits contained in Crim PR 17.23(1) and (2), the Court may extend the time limit 
if it believes it to be in the interests of justice to do so and may do so even after 
the time limit has expired’. 
46 Ibid at para 40. 
47 [2014] EWHC 3433 (Admin), at para 2. 
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could attach and there was no article 14 discrimination.48 Agardi’s EU 
law arguments were similarly dismissed. They were founded upon on 
article 18 TFEU prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of 
nationality and article 47 of the Charter protecting the right to a 
remedy and a fair trial.  The High Court firstly noted that the 
Framework Decision does not require that a State provide for a right 
of appeal against an extradition order, nor does it set any procedural 
parameters if an appeal process is created by national law.49 This was 
critical because articles 18 and 47 turn on whether the discrimination 
and putative human rights violation occur ‘within the scope of the 
treaties’ and ‘when implementing EU law’ respectively.50 As section 
26(4) governing the time limits was not based upon or implementing 
EU law those provisions did not apply to it. Accordingly, the 
arguments based upon EU law were dismissed.51  The distinction 
between UK nationals and all others continues.52 In spite of this it is 
clear that the law has evolved. It now admits the application of article 
6 to the extradition hearings of UK nationals. It does so because 
extradition interferes with the common law and international legal 
entitlement of UK nationals to remain in their country. In contrast to 
this expansion in the applicability of article 6 has been the 
development of the law as it relates to trials abroad. The law as 
established in Soering has not broadened in its application. Instead 
the opposite has happened. The narrow and restrictive origins of the 
law have been further limited.  
 
ARTICLE 6 AND TRIALS ABROAD 
 
The genesis of the application of article 6 to trials abroad is Soering 
v UK. It established the principle that a requested State must not 
extradite an individual where there is a real risk of a human rights 
                                                 
48 The UK has neither signed nor ratified Protocol 12 to the ECHR which prohibits 
discrimination without reference to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set 
out within the Convention as found in article 14. 
49 Supra note 47 at para 27. 
50 The former phrase prefaces article 18, and the latter is found in article 51 of the 
Charter.  
51 A point in the case that appears moot today is that the Court held that article 47 
did not have direct effect within the UK. Notably, there have been decisions since 
Agardi to the opposite effect, including that of the Court of Appeal in 
Benkharbouche v Sudan [2015] EWCA Civ 33. 
52 Seemingly in support of the discrimination between UK and all others including 
EU nationals is the Grand Chamber case of Criminal Proceedings Against Petruhhin 
(C-182/15) EU:C:2016:630, [2017] QB 299. Here it was held, in essence, that 
discrimination between nationals and other EU nationals in the context of 
extradition can be justified if it was based upon objective considerations and 
proportionate to the aim of the rule. See further A Klip, Europeans first! Petruhhin, 
an Unexpected Revolution in Extradition Law, (2017) 25(3) Eur. J. Crime Cr. L. Cr. 
J. 195. 
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violation occurring within the requesting territory. On the basis of this 
principle the ECtHR and UK courts have accepted that a number of 
human rights under the ECHR have possible extraterritorial 
applicability.53 Whilst Soering rejected an argument based upon the 
right to a fair trial it importantly admitted it could form the basis of 
an argument. The ECtHR stated: 
The right to a fair trial in criminal proceedings, as embodied in 
Article 6, holds a prominent place in a democratic society. The 
Court does not exclude that an issue might exceptionally be 
raised under Article 6 by an extradition decision in 
circumstances where the fugitive has suffered or risks suffering 
a flagrant denial of a fair trial in the requesting country.54 
In Mamatkulov and Askarov v Turkey the ECtHR developed the law 
from the point of accepting that an extraterritorial argument was not 
excluded to it being accepted and considered. In the circumstances, 
however, the ECtHR held the argument failed as the facts Turkey 
knew or should have known at the point of extradition were not such 
to constitute a flagrant denial of justice.55 Following Soering and 
Mamatkulov and Askarov v Turkey the position within the UK is that 
an argument against extradition on the basis of a real risk of a past 
or future flagrant denial of justice within the requesting State is 
tenable. From the outset however, as the ECtHR explicitly stated, the 
circumstances where a relevant issue could be raised were 
exceptional. That has proven to be the case. Notably, though, that 
exceptionality has increased. The narrow and restrictive origins of the 
law on this point have tightened. Judicial developments in both the 
UK and the ECtHR have effected a retrenchment in the law. The 
operation of the ‘living instrument’ doctrine in this respect can be 
seen to reflect a narrow, state-centered interpretation in light of 
present day conditions. 56  These conditions being an enhanced 
governmental and societal willingness and desire to address 
                                                 
53 Lord Bingham considered the breadth of applicable rights in Regina Ex Parte Ullah 
(FC) v Special Adjudicator and concluded that articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9 could 
apply in such a way. The criteria upon which extraterritorial applicability is 
accepted, as far as they can be ascertained, are somewhat vague. For example the 
right to life applies in such a matter on account of the ‘special importance’ attached 
to it by international human rights law, and the right to be free from slavery and 
forced labour because it would be incompatible with the ‘humanitarian principles 
underpinning the Convention’ if it were not, at paras 15 and 16. As noted presently, 
the right to a fair trial applies on an extraterritorial basis because of its ‘prominent 
place in a democratic society’.  
54 Supra note at para 113. This position is followed in somewhat similar terms by 
inter alia by section 7(1) of the UN Model Law on Extradition, 
https://www.unodc.org/pdf/model_law_extradition.pdf, and article 6(3) of the 
Hong Kong–United States Agreement for the Surrender of Fugitive Offenders 1996, 
(1997) 36 ILM 842. 
55 Supra note 31 at para 91.  
56 The origins of the doctrine are found in Tyrer v UK (1978) 2 EHRR 1.  
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transnational criminality and defer to the judicial systems of third 
states. Accordingly, the evolution of the test conditioning the 
application of article 6 to trials abroad stands in direct contrast to 
that pertaining to UK extradition hearings.  
 
Originally the jurisprudence following Soering reiterated the 
formulation found within that case and highlighted the exceptional 
circumstances in which an article 6 argument will successfully 
prevent an extradition. In the well-known deportation decision of 
Regina Ex Parte Ullah (FC) v Special Adjudicator Lord Bingham 
surveyed the law up to that point and concluded that the ECtHR “… 
has not excluded the possibility of relying on article 6, and even 
article 5, while fully recognising the great difficulty of doing so and 
the exceptional nature of such cases”.57 Not long after Ullah was the 
case of Bermingham and Others v United States 58  where an 
argument against extradition by the so-called NatWest Three was 
founded upon article 6.59 The Divisional Court held that the District 
Judge had correctly directed himself to the appropriate question, 
which was whether the requested persons faced a clear risk of 
suffering a flagrant denial of a fair trial in Texas.60 The requested 
persons had inter alia averred that their trials would be in breach of 
article 6 because they would be denied bail, the conditions in which 
they would be held would be inimical to their ability to prepare their 
defence and there would be a long delay before trial. Further, they 
argued that there would be difficulties in obtaining full and timely 
disclosure of documents from the prosecution, the Houston jury 
would be prejudiced against them and an application to change venue 
was likely to be unsuccessful. 61  The article 6 argument was 
summarily dismissed, in part with reference to the US Constitutional 
protection afforded to the right to a fair trial, the Sixth Amendment. 
The court stated that that provision’s ‘… content is strikingly similar 
to that of ECHR Article 6. It would be frankly grotesque for this court 
to hold, on the strength of testimony which the District Judge 
concluded was parti pris, that this fundamental constitutional right 
would be more honoured in the breach than the observance at any 
                                                 
57 Supra note 16 at para 21. In the case Lord Bingham highlighted the difficulty of 
applicants meeting the requisite test, which for the right at issue, the qualified right 
of thought, conscience and religion in article 9, was correctly said to be that “… the 
right will be completely denied or nullified in the destination country; that it can be 
said that removal will breach the treaty obligations of the signatory state however 
those obligations might be interpreted or whatever might be said by or on behalf 
of the destination state”, at para 24, citing Devaseelan v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, [2002] UKIAT 702 at para 111. 
58 [2006] EWHC 200 (Admin). 
59 See P Arnell, Scots Extradited, (2008) 4 Juridical Review 241. 
60 Supra note 58 at para 111. 
61 Ibid at para 106. 
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trial of the defendants in Houston’. 62  Bermingham confirms the 
exceptionality of successful article 6 arguments. It also sheds light 
on a basis for that position – judicial deference to the law and 
judiciary in the requesting territory.  
 
A case of considerable importance in the future development of 
the law is the House of Lords decision in RB (Algeria) and another v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department.63 The relevant part of 
the case for our purposes is an appeal by the Secretary of State 
against a decision of the Court of Appeal allowing Omar Othman’s 
appeal against his deportation to Jordon on the basis of article 6.64 
As will be discussed below, the ECtHR subsequently disagreed with 
the conclusion of the House of Lords on whether Othman risked 
suffering a flagrant denial of justice. The importance of RB (Algeria), 
however, is found in the discussion of the meaning of flagrant breach. 
Lord Phillips firstly noted that because there is no reported foreign 
case where article 6 had been successfully invoked there was a lack 
of authoritative guidance on its meaning. He stated that the approach 
to that meaning was not so easy because article 6 was a procedural 
right, not a substantive one.65 A minority opinion in Mamatkulov and 
Askarov v Turkey66 was referred to by Lord Phillips because it had 
formulated the test in somewhat greater detail. He quoted a passage 
from the opinion including: 
What constituted a ‘flagrant’ denial of justice has not been fully 
explained in the court’s jurisprudence but the use of the 
adjective is clearly intended to impose a stringent test of 
unfairness going beyond mere irregularities or lack of 
safeguards… [w]hat the word ‘flagrant’ is intended to convey is 
a breach of the principles of fair trail guaranteed by article 6 
which is so fundamental as to amount to a nullification, or 
destruction of the very essence, of the right guaranteed by that 
article.67 
This formulation was adopted by the ECtHR in its unanimous decision 
in Othman v UK68, discussed below.  
 
Significantly, though, Lord Phillips introduces a further element 
into the test. After noting that the test remained one that was neither 
easy or adequate he stated ‘The focus must be simply not on the 
                                                 
62 Ibid at para 110. 
63 [2009] UKHL 10. 
64 The Court of Appeal had allowed Othman’s appeal from the Special Immigration 
Appeals Commission, in Othman (Jordan) v Secretary of State [2008] EWCA Civ 
290 which was in turn overturned in RB (Algeria). 
65 Supra note 63 at para 133.  
66 Supra note 31 at para O-III 14. 
67 Ibid. Cited in RB (Algeria) at para 133. 
68(2012) 55 EHRR 1.  
17 
unfairness of the trial process but on its potential consequences. An 
unfair trial is likely to lead to the violation of substantive human rights 
and the extent of that prospective violation must plainly be an 
important factor in deciding whether deportation is precluded’.69 Lord 
Phillips then goes on to suggest that such a substantive violation 
includes those of the right to life, and perhaps the right to liberty, 
under articles 2 and 5 respectively. This novel development in the 
law heightens the bar in article 6 arguments. Affected individuals not 
only have to show that there are substantial grounds for believing 
that there is a real risk of a flagrant denial of justice but also that 
that denial will have the consequence of a serious violation of a 
substantive right or rights. That detention following a flagrantly unfair 
trial may amount to a violation of article 5(1)a, as Lord Phillips notes, 
might mean that this new formulation does not in fact affect the 
essence of the test. However, it is also true that it adds to the subject 
matter that must be established by the individual making the 
argument. The effect of RB (Algeria) per se in regard to extradition 
is limited because it is restricted to deportation.70 Lord Phillips stated 
‘If there is a real risk that the trial will be flagrantly unfair, that is 
likely to be enough of itself to prevent extradition regardless of the 
likely consequences of the unfair trial’. 71 Whilst this exclusion of 
extradition was accepted by Lord Brown in the case, it was done so 
only reluctantly. He noted that ‘… it should be recognized too, and 
countervailingly, that there may be compelling reasons in favour of 
extradition rather than that the suspect should enjoy an undeserved 
safe haven from prosecution’. 72  Lord Brown’s view prefaces the 
acceptance of this new facet of the test in extradition proceedings in 
Rwanda v Brown and others73, discussed below.74 
 
The leading ECtHR case on article 6 and trials abroad is Othman 
v United Kingdom.  It followed RB (Algeria) and confirmed – to an 
extent – the law as stated in that case. The case is also notable 
because in it the ECtHR held for the first time that a deportation75 
                                                 
69 Supra note 63 at para 137. 
70 Ibid at para 139. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid at para 259. 
73 [2017] EWHC 1912 (Admin). 
74 Following RB (Algeria) Elliott stated that ‘… the the protection afforded by the 
flagrant denial of justice test is largely if not wholly illusory’, M Elliott, Torture, 
Deportation and Extrajudicial Detention: Instruments of the ‘War on Terror’, (2009) 
Cambridge Law Journal 245 at p 248. 
75 In Ahmad v UK (2013) 56 EHRR 1 the ECtHR held that there should be no 
distinction between extradition and other forms of expulsion when considering the 
question whether there is a real risk of treatment contrary to article 3 in another 
State, at para 168.  
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would violate article 6. 76  In coming to its decision the ECtHR 
reiterated the applicable test and set out a list of circumstances which 
could amount to a violation of article 6. It noted that a flagrant denial 
of justice is a stringent test of unfairness that has been held to be 
synonymous with a trial which is manifestly contrary to the provisions 
of article 6 or the principles embodied therein.77 Circumstances which 
could amount to a flagrant denial of justice, it held, included a 
conviction in absentia with no possibility of a fresh determination of 
the charge, a trial which is summary in nature with a total disregard 
for the rights of the defence and where there is a deliberate and 
systematic refusal of access to a lawyer.78 Having noted that in the 
then 22 years following the Soering the ECtHR had never held that 
an expulsion would be in contravention of article 6 it confirmed a 
restrictive interpretation of the applicable test. It held that what is 
required is a breach of the principles of article 6 so fundamental as 
to amount to a nullification, or destruction of the very essence of the 
right.79 It further held that the burden of proof falls on the applicant 
to adduce evidence that there are substantial grounds for believing 
that if removed he would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected 
to a flagrant denial of justice. The ECtHR held that it was not 
necessary in the present case to consider whether a flagrant denial 
of justice only arises when the trial would have serious consequences 
for the person concerned.80 This was because Othman had been tried 
and convicted in his absence and a substantial term of imprisonment 
had been imposed. 
 
The specific question relating to the article 6 argument in 
Othman was whether the admission at his retrial of evidence obtained 
by the torture of third persons amounted to a flagrant denial of 
justice. The ECtHR held that both Convention jurisprudence and rules 
of international law more generally provided that the admission of 
torture evidence is manifestly contrary to both the provisions of 
                                                 
76 Notably, article 6 has been successfully relied upon in the extradition cases of R 
(Ramda) v Secretary of State [2002] EWHC 1278 (Admin), Brown v Rwanda [2009] 
EHWC 770 (Admin), and Rwanda v Brown and others. In the first case the High 
Court quashed a decision of the Secretary of State to order Ramda’s extradition to 
France inter alia on the basis that there was a real risk of his being denied a fair 
trial there, the case was decided under the Extradition Act 1989. 
77 Supra note 68 at paras 259-260. See generally J Middleton, Taking Rights 
Seriously in Expulsion Cases: a Case Study, (2013) 5 European Human Rights Law 
Review 520.   
78 Ibid, referring to, respectively, Stoichkov v Bulgaria (2007) 44 EHRR 14 at para 
56, Bader v Sweden (2008) 46 EHRR 13 at para 47, and Al-Moayad v Germany 
(2007) 44 EHRR SE22 at para 101. 
79 Supra note 68 at para 260. As seen, the origins of this phraseology are found in 
the dissenting opinion in Mamatkulov and Askarov v Turkey. 
80 Ibid at para 262. 
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article 6 and the basic international standards of a fair trial.81 Lending 
weight to the importance of the right to a fair trial the court stated 
that the trial process is ‘a cornerstone of the rule of law’.82 Applying 
the law as it set out to the facts of Othman’s case the ECtHR firstly 
held that Othman had discharged the burden upon him to establish 
that the evidence against him was obtained by torture. It rejected a 
contention that a balance of probabilities test was appropriately 
imposed on that burden.83 Substantively it held the test was met. It 
agreed with the Court of Appeal that there was a real risk that 
Othman’s retrial would entail a flagrant denial of justice. Othman’s 
case was ‘… a sustained and well-founded attack on a State Security 
Court system that will try him in breach of one of the most 
fundamental norms of international criminal justice…’.84 The Court 
found that Othman’s deportation to Jordan would be in violation of 
article 6.85  
 
Five years after Othman the English High Court decided 
Rwanda v Brown and others. The case, arising from the genocide in 
Rwanda in 1994, held that the narrowing of the article 6 test put 
forward in RB (Algeria) as applying to deportation also applied to 
extradition. Specifically, Rwanda v Brown and others was an appeal 
of the decision of Senior District Judge Arbuthnot in 2015 declining 
to permit the extradition of five men because there was a real risk 
that they might suffer a flagrant breach of their rights to a fair trial if 
extradited.86 The court had to decide if the judge in the Magistrates’ 
Court should have decided the case differently. It began by discussing 
the legal test to be applied in some depth, referring to a number of 
the leading ECtHR and UK decisions, including Soering, Mamatkulov 
                                                 
81 Ibid at para 267. 
82 Ibid at para 264. 
83 Ibid at para 274. 
84 Ibid at para 285. 
85 Interestingly the ECtHR discussed the fact that its conclusion differed from that 
of the Grand Chamber in Mamatkulov and Askarov v Turkey. It did so, in part, on 
account of the complaint there being of a ‘general and unspecific nature’ averring 
that the complainants had no prospect of receiving a fair trial in Uzbekistan. 
Mamatkulov and Askarov v Turkey in this sense mirrors the decision of the High 
Court of Justiciary in Kapri v Lord Advocate [2014] HCJAC 33. 
86 This reasoning pertained to four of the five requested persons. The extradition 
of a fifth was also barred also under section 80 of the 2003 Act prohibiting double 
jeopardy. This was the second attempt by Rwanda to secure four of the five 
individuals. The first was unsuccessful on appeal also on the basis of article 6, 
Brown v Rwanda [2009] EWHC 770 (Admin). That case is discussed in M A Drumbl, 
Prosecution of Genocide v. the Fair Trial Principle, (2010) 8 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 289. Drumbl notes that this decision reportedly ‘… is the first 
instance where an English court has denied an extradition request from a foreign 
government on the basis of the prospect of a violation of ECHR fair trial rights…’, 
at page 299. However, see footnote 76 above and the case of R (Ramda) v 
Secretary of State [2002] EWHC 1278 (Admin). 
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and Askarov v Turkey, R (Ullah) v Special Adjudicator, Othman and 
Kapri. As in Othman, the Court concluded that where reliance is 
placed on article 6 it must be shown that a person has suffered or 
risks suffering a flagrant denial of a fair trial in the receiving state 
with ‘flagrant’ conveying ‘… a breach of the principles of fair trial 
guaranteed by Article 6 which is so fundamental as to amount to a 
nullification, or destruction of the very essence, of the right 
guaranteed by that article’.87  
 
The High Court in Rwanda v Brown and others entered into 
novel territory after reiterating the article 6 as laid out in Othman. It 
noted the difficulty in approaching the meaning of flagrant breach 
because of the procedural nature of article 6. It concluded on the 
point ‘The consideration of the risk of denial of justice must go beyond 
the procedural…. The Court should be giving consideration to the 
outcome of a breach, if it eventuates’.88 In other words, the Court 
affirmed the necessity of looking at the potential consequences of a 
conviction. Accordingly, a lack of judicial independence or impartiality 
however serious appear not to be sufficient per se to establish a 
flagrant denial of justice. Deciding on the potential consequence of a 
conviction is, of course, very difficult in prospective cases. As the 
Court stated ‘… a retrospective examination of whether there was in 
fact a “flagrant denial of justice” in a completed case where the facts 
are known, may be significantly different from considering whether 
there is a real risk of a flagrant denial of justice in the future’.89 
Having adopted this extension to the test, the Court concluded its 
opinion on the law by noting that the rarity of cases where article 6 
has been successfully invoked emphasises how significant the denial 
of justice must be and further that the risk of flagrant denial must be 
a ‘… risk of real substance, a risk of a truly serious denial of justice’.90 
Altogether, then, the District Court narrowed an already exceptional 
test by incorporating into it, in extradition cases, the necessity of the 
flagrant denial of justice having a ‘significant adverse outcome, in 
terms of the nature of conviction and sentence’.91 It did not, however, 
explicitly require that outcome or consequence to amount to a 
violation of a distinct substantive right, as was suggested by Lord 
Phillips in RB (Algeria).  
                                                 
87 Supra note 73 at para 68, citing Mamatkulov and Askarov v Turkey, supra note 
29 at para O-III 14. 
88 Ibid at para 94.  
89 Ibid at para 87. 
90 Ibid at paras 93 and 98. In Brown v Rwanda 2009 the High Court stated that the 
word ‘flagrant’ is included ‘because in such a case the ECHR rights apply 
exceptionally and by extension, to protect the individual from being consigned by 
a State Party to the ECHR to another territory where he might suffer ill-treatment 
in violation of the Convention standards’, at para 24. 
91 Ibid at para 94. 
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After considerable and detailed examination of the evidence – 
the judgment runs to 106 pages – the Divisional Court applied the 
law to the facts and gave its conclusions on the fair trial debate. The 
Court refused the appeal by the Government of Rwanda against the 
decision of the Magistrates’ Court. In doing so it firstly held that 
ideally those accused of genocide should be tried where the criminal 
acts took place.92 The high-bar set by the law reflected that point. 
However, Rwanda had become more illiberal and authoritarian since 
the 2009 decision. There is a risk, it held, of interference and pressure 
in these cases unless clear conditions of guarantee are established. 
The importance of an effective defence emphasised in the 
Magistrates’ Court was also at the heart of the Divisional Court’s 
decision. It was ‘… the vital element, the capstone of the case’. 93 
Whilst in the UK safeguards such as unbiased prosecution, witness 
protection, and judicial independence can act to compensate 
somewhat inadequate defence representation, these were in question 
in Rwanda. The problems identified were sufficient to establish a real 
risk of a truly serious or flagrant denial of justice that the result of 
which ‘… might be likely to lead to serious miscarriages of justice’.94 
Rwanda v Brown and others, therefore, is one of the exceptional 
cases where an argument of the basis of article 6 against extradition 
was upheld. Ironically, through narrowing an already restrictive test 
the case also appears set to make successful arguments more difficult 
in the future.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Article 6 and extradition are undoubtedly uneasy bedfellows. The 
terms of article 6, the desire to address international criminality and 
adhere to international legal obligations in light of the universally 
accepted importance of the right to a fair trial lay at the root of the 
conflict. The law has struggled to accommodate article 6 ever since 
Soering was decided in 1989. After nearly thirty years, and the 
enactment of the 2003 Act and the Human Rights Act 1998, the 
struggle persists. As demonstrated however, the law has moved in 
contrasting directions. Within the UK, the Supreme Court has opened 
the door to the application of article 6 to the extradition hearings of 
                                                 
92  Drumbl notes the paradox that ‘Influential states that failed to prevent or 
mitigate genocide in Rwanda now act, out of apparent concern for human rights, 
to circumscribe Rwanda’s ability to prosecute suspects against whom there are 
prima facie cases of genocide’, supra note 86 at page 302. He states that the result 
is preposterous.  
93 Ibid at para 377. 
94 Ibid at para 379. Notably, the Court gave the Government a final opportunity to 
seek to assure it that ‘… credible and verifiable conditions will be in place, to 
overcome the legal bar to extradition…’, at para 382. It appears that these 
assurances were not forthcoming.  
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UK nationals. This is positive, yet limited. Extradition deprives all 
those subject to it from the prerequisite to the full enjoyment of one’s 
human rights under the Human Rights Act 1998. As such all 
extradition hearings should be conditioned with fair trial protection. 
The position within the UK, therefore, is discriminatory and, arguably, 
unlawful. It is discriminatory because the protection afforded turns 
on the nationality of the requested person. It is arguably unlawful 
because discrimination in the application of Convention rights on the 
basis of nationality is prohibited under article 14. Further, human 
rights protection applies within the UK not on the basis of nationality, 
but rather on being within its jurisdiction. Whilst the particular rule 
that gave rise to the dispute in Pomiechowski has been amended, 
there are further features of the process that could similarly give rise 
article 6 arguments. Such a case could only be brought by a UK 
national. A decision of the ECtHR on the unequal operation of the law 
is called for.  
 
Extraterritorially, the door to the applicability of article 6 
opened ever so slightly by Soering has been creeping shut. The 
interpretation of flagrant denial of justice to mean a nullification or 
destruction of the very essence of the right was a step in that 
direction. More recently, the law’s emphasis upon the consequences 
of an unfair trial adds a new and further restrictive element to the 
test. Whilst the Divisional Court in Rwanda v Brown and others upheld 
the decision of the Magistrates’ Court, successful extraterritorial 
arguments on the basis of article 6 appear set to remain wholly 
exceptional. This is regrettable but understandable. Be it in the 
context of systemic judicial corruption in Albania or highly 
questionable pre-trial practices in Jordan, the extradition of an 
individual in the knowledge that that treatment would likely not only 
breach article 6 within the UK but also would fall a considerable way 
beneath minimum required here is morally questionable and appear 
to conflict with fair trial protections under public international law. Of 
course the UK cannot export the standards applied within it in toto 
abroad. Variations in criminal justice systems and standards are 
inevitable, but that does not mean test needs to be so restrictive. The 
law as interpreted by the judiciary however supports the test’s 
exceptionality.95 The law is understood from the point of view of 
international extradition agreements, the comity of nations and the 
                                                 
95 A further illustration is found in Section 50.2 of the English Criminal Procedure 
Rules. It inter alia provides ‘When exercising a power to which this Part applies … 
the court must have regard to the importance of (a) mutual confidence and 
recognition between judicial authorities in the United Kingdom and in requesting 
territories; and (b) the conduct of extradition proceedings in accordance with 
international obligations, including obligations to deal swiftly with extradition 
requests’, cited at https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-
rules/criminal/docs/2015/crim-proc-rules-2015-part-50.pdf. 
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desire to combat transnational criminality. As La Forest, J., said in 
the Canadian Supreme Court in 1987: 
The assumption that the requesting state will give the fugitive 
a fair trial according to its laws underlies the whole theory and 
practice of extradition and our courts have over many years 
made it abundantly clear that an extradition judge should not 
give effect to any suggestion that the proceedings are 
oppressive or that the fugitive will not be given a fair trial … the 
assumption by an extradition judge that delay or other defences 
would not be given appropriate consideration by the foreign 
court… amounts to a serious adverse reflection not only on a 
foreign government to whom Canada has a treaty obligation but 
on its judicial authorities concerning matters that are 
exclusively within their competence.96  
 
The application of article 6 to UK extradition hearings and trials 
abroad is travelling in opposite directions. This has been a 
jurisprudential development, and one where UK courts have played 
a material role. As is well known, UK courts are obliged to act 
compatibly with human rights and to take decisions of the ECtHR into 
account. To this end they must generally follow the jurisprudence of 
the ECtHR. As seen, the exclusion of article 6 to domestic hearings 
and its extension to trials abroad are features of ECtHR 
jurisprudence. UK courts therefore have followed the ECtHR’s lead. 
They have also, however, gone further in extending a degree of 
protection to UK nationals subjected to extradition and in interpreting 
the article 6 test in a manner which is more restrictive than that 
developed by the ECtHR itself. Clearly the courts are faced with 
conflicting considerations. In attempting to reconcile the 
irreconcilable they have created a position where article 6 has come 
to apply to UK extradition hearings and trials abroad in contrasting 
directions.   
                                                 
96 In Argentina v. Mellino, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 536, 554-555, cited in Dugard and 
Wyngaert, supra note 12 at p 189-190. 
